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The puzzle of heterogeneity in support
for free trade
Abstract: Over time and across countries, researchers have noted frequent and
mostly unexplained gender differences in the levels of support for policies of free
or freer trade: according to aggregate results from many surveys, women tend
to be less favorable toward policies of liberalizing trade than men. Positing an
economic security explanation based largely on a mobile factors approach, we
ask if it is women generally who are more negative toward trade or rather women
who are more economically vulnerable – i.e., women from the scarce labor factor.
We utilize data from two recent surveys on individuals’ attitudes toward different
facets of trade and its effects to examine this hypothesis empirically. Rejecting
a monolithic definition of “women,” we find that disaggregating by education
level illuminates to some extent what underlying characteristics might be helping
to drive some of these findings. Lower-skilled women in the US are much less
likely to support free trade compared to higher-skilled women and this may
largely explain previous negative findings. The low versus high-skill dynamic is,
however, much less clear in the findings using survey data from a small sample
of developing countries.
DOI 10.1515/bap-2013-0039
Previously published online July 4, 2014

1 Introduction
Over time and across countries, researchers have noted frequent and mostly
unexplained gender differences in the levels of support for policies of free or freer
trade: women tend to be less favorable toward policies of liberalizing trade than
men.1 Because citizens can and often influence the making of this vital macroeco1 For example, Seligson (1999); Graham and Pettinato (2001); O’Rourke and Sinnott (2001);
Scheve and Slaughter (2001); Baker (2005, 2009); Mayda and Rodrik (2005).
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nomic policy, and women comprise > 50% of the population in most countries,
women’s possibly distinct preferences in this major policy area are an important
phenomenon to consider. While earlier studies have posited multiple explanations for general attitudes toward trade policy, no well-substantiated account of
the gender component of trade attitudes has emerged.2
While this research seeks to address all of the above approaches in order to
explain gender differences in trade attitudes, it posits the concept of labor mobility as a reasonable theoretical starting point, but with a gender twist. We hypothesize that it is not women in general who tend to be negative toward trade but
particularly women in the less abundant labor factor – higher or lower-skilled
depending on the country context – who have heightened concerns about open
trade’s negative effects on them. In particular, these individuals tend to be more
concerned about the potentially disruptive economic effects that such policies
might have on them or their families.
One of the central obstacles to testing theoretical propositions related to
explaining trade policy attitudes has been the limitations of the available data.
Most public opinion surveys ask respondents to provide only a general opinion
about free trade, and researchers are left to conjecture as to which particular
aspect(s) of trade policy and/or its effects the respondent is reacting.3 Trade is
complex and few surveys ask questions about its meaningful components, a
shortcoming that poses serious problems for direct testing of many key hypotheses. Trade, and more importantly, changes in trade policy, can have a number
2 The few studies focusing specifically on the gender-trade attitudes nexus underscore exposure
to economic ideas (Burgoon and Hiscox 2004) and consumption decisions (Hall, Kao, and Nelson 1998), while those examining general attitudes toward trade have employed not only these
two approaches (e.g. Hainmueller and Hiscox 2006; Baker 2009), but have also emphasized
more traditional mobile factors (Scheve and Slaughter 2001) and specific factors (Mayda and
Rodrik 2005) approaches, in addition to considering education as human capital (Gabel 1998)
and sociotropic concerns (Mansfield and Mutz 2009).
3 The following surveys include general questions about attitudes toward trade or trade policy:
the American National Election Study or NES 1992 (Scheve and Slaughter 2001; Blonigen 2009);
Globescan International Survey 2003 (Baker 2009); International Social Survey Program or ISSP
1995 (O’Rourke and Sinnott 2001; Mayda and Rodrik 2005); Knowledge Networks 2007 (Mansfield and Mutz 2009); Latinobarometro 1996 (Beaulieu, Yatawara, and Wang 2005), 1997 (Baker
2009); the National Annenberg Election Study 2004 (Mansfield and Mutz 2009); Pew Global Attitudes Project 2002, 2007 (Baker 2009); Time-Sharing Experiments for the Social Sciences or
TESS 2003 (Burgoon and Hiscox 2004); the Wall Street Journal Americas 1998 (Baker 2009); the
World Values Survey 1990–1992, 1995–1997, 1999–2001 (Baker 2005, 2009; Kaltenthaler, Gelleny,
and Ceccoli 2004; used 1995–1997 only). Baker (2009: Ch. 8) utilizes some questions from his
4-City Survey (Brazil – 2005) about particular aspects of trade but uses them to create an index
and explore a different theoretical inquiry.
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of major implications for individuals and societies, and respondents are likely
to be more concerned about the particular aspects that most affect them or their
household, including, e.g., trade’s effects on consumption, jobs (theirs and/or
employment more broadly) and economic growth. These specific concerns are
the components shaping the “general” attitudes upon which most researchers
focus. Specific to this inquiry, the existing literature suggests that there may be
a gendered component to many of these aspects, including those related to economic security and possibly consumption.
Ideally, in order to determine more effectively why women may be generally
less receptive to trade liberalization, survey questions need to ask directly about
the specific aspects and/or effects of trade policy that might be affecting women
differently. Such data are even better if they are collected across space and time.
Researchers can then employ these more nuanced responses as dependent
variables in order to test competing or complementary theoretical propositions
more meaningfully. Exploring gender differences in individuals’ wide-ranging
concerns about trade’s effects on different facets of economic security helps to
ensure that the findings are robust. The breadth of questions might also help to
disentangle the effects of major causal and/or other important variables that are
otherwise lumped together in the general questions.
Two recent major public opinion surveys – the first on the US and the second
on five countries with predominant or large Muslim populations – offer an excellent opportunity to explore some of these complexities because they probe deeply
and widely into individuals’ perceptions of and attitudes toward trade and its
effects. Survey themes emphasize economic concerns – e.g., jobs, overall economic growth, markets for exports, employment, and pocketbook economic
concerns and consumption – while also collecting other crucial individual-level
data such as educational attainment. A multi-country and region research design
serves to examine possible divergence in gender’s effects on trade attitudes
between developed and developing countries, thereby helping to test a mobile
factors theory more effectively.
The empirical findings of this research suggest that a mobile factors approach
is a useful theoretical starting point in an explanation of gender differences in
trade attitudes, at least in one major developed economy, the US. In the US, less
educated women are more likely to have negative attitudes toward international
trade and many things that it affects including consumption, workers, business,
the overall economy and the individual-level “pocketbook” concerns. In contrast,
women with higher levels of formal education in the US are more likely to report
that trade has positive effects on the country’s workers and consumption. The
results from the developing country survey are much less clear. Notably, there
appears to be little evidence of a divide between less and more educated women
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in the Muslim-country survey. Though the logistic regression results preliminarily
suggest a weak negative relationship between educated women and free trade, a
more sophisticated empirical analysis suggests that the logistic results provide
incomplete information that is likely affecting any inference.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the literature and develops the theoretical framework. Data and the methodology are given in Section 3,
while Section 4 presents the empirical results. Alternative explanations are discussed in Section 5, and the paper ends with concluding remarks in Section 6.

2 Literature and theoretical framework
The existing literature on trade policy attitudes has empirically established that
a number of theoretical approaches offer explanatory utility. Recognizing this
utility, and because there are no compelling reasons that these explanations need
to be theoretically or empirically exclusive of each other, we employ a framework
that seeks to integrate them. However, because the literature on trade attitudes
has grown somewhat vast, we will focus in this section on the approaches that
have been most directly associated with gender and/or are most germane to our
broader argument, including economic security, consumption, education/knowledge and risk.

2.1 A mobile factors approach and economic security
A major component of economic security is labor mobility. In a mobile factors
approach to explaining trade attitudes, individuals in the abundant labor factor
– higher-skilled in developed countries and lower-skilled in developing countries
– are more likely to prefer policies of freer trade because they are theoretically
better positioned to thrive in a more liberalized economy.4 Researchers argue that
the goods or services generated by the abundant labor factor are comparatively
more competitive in the global marketplace, which garners those workers higher
wages. The corollary suggests that individuals in the scarce factor – lower-skilled
in developed countries and higher-skilled in developing countries – will be more

4 In an analysis of the relationship between trade policy and inequality, Dutt and Mitra (2002)
also employ a framework consistent with a mobile factors approach. Though gender and
inequality are of course distinct concepts, the multi-purpose nature of the general framework
illustrates its broad utility.
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skeptical of liberalized trade because their industry will not do as well thereby
mitigating demand for their skills and driving down their wages.5
We suggest the possibility that the scarce-factor dynamic is particularly
heightened for women because they potentially face even greater economic and
workforce constraints than men and stand potentially to lose more from policies that may cause economic distortion or dislocation. Many researchers have
noted and some have demonstrated empirically that women often bear a disproportionate economic burden after liberalization.6 The broader literature on
gender-related labor issues has highlighted a number of potential challenges
that women are more likely to face than men in the labor marketplace, including
among others: a higher likelihood of part-time work, which is generally much less
secure than full-time work; a greater probability of leaving the paid workforce at
different points to provide care (children or others); fewer years of experience to
secure promotions and new positions (a consequence often of the previous two
challenges); and blatant gender discrimination. The literature on gender effects
of economic reform makes the connection that these types of challenges are often
heightened when economic conditions change, such as when countries liberalize. Therefore, women in the scarce labor factor face a veritable double burden:
both their gender and their skill set might limit their economic opportunities. It is
reasonable therefore to expect that these women might tend to be more skeptical
of economic policy changes that present potential uncertainty to their already
more precarious economic status, including trade liberalization.
Accordingly, we should be able to observe clear evidence of predictable differences among more and less educated women in both developed and less developed economies. In developed economies, women with more formal education,
by virtue of being the abundant labor factor, should enjoy greater labor market
flexibility and opportunity and be more positive toward different facets of trade.
Also, in developed economies such as the US, less educated women are generally
more economically vulnerable and may demonstrate wide-ranging and deeper
concerns about liberalizing trade. Kucera and Milberg demonstrate empirically
that in the higher-skilled Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries, trade with countries with abundant lower-skilled labor
has had a disproportionate negative effect on lower-skilled female workers in
these more developed economies.7

5 For in-depth general discussions of these approaches, see Baker (2009); and Mansfield and
Mutz (2009).
6 See, e.g., School of International and Public Affairs (2001) and Tickner (2001).
7 Kucera and Milberg (2000).
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In developing countries, higher-skilled skilled workers are not only the scarce
labor factor, but higher-skilled women in particular in many circumstances are
newer to and a minority in the workforce (compared not only to men in their
countries, but also compared to educated women’s relative positions in developed
economies), and may be the first to feel negative effects as labor demands change.
Empirically, the ILO finds precisely this negative dynamic across a wide range
of developing countries and regions: educated women are consistently facing
lower wages, losing their jobs and not finding work disproportionate to educated
men.8 Thus, policies such as free trade that can generate significant economic
change may be more likely to be viewed with skepticism and even negativity by
these women. Finally, theory also suggests that less educated women in developing countries will be more likely to endorse freer trade. Recent empirical studies
demonstrate that in the post-liberalization environment, wage gains for women
in developing countries have accrued disproportionately to the lower-skilled.9
Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that they might look at trade more positively
than their better-educated compatriots. However, this expectation should also
be tempered with the complex economic reality that while lower-skilled women
might be doing better than before economic opening, many studies show that
trade liberalization generates winners and losers as labor is reallocated according to factor endowments and some groups of low-skilled women have also fared
poorly.10
Kaltenthaler et al. and Seligson have shown that another component of the
mobile factors approach is individuals’ direct economic pocketbook concerns,
because these concerns are closely associated with wages and consumption, and
thus economic security of the individual and their household.11 Though studies
have found only occasional evidence that these concerns drive individual-level
attitudes toward trade, women may feel these microeconomic pressures more
acutely than men. In recent decades, women have been taking an increasingly
direct household management role in both developed and developing countries,
and pocketbook concerns may now be more important to many women because
of these significant role changes.12
Changes in trade policy might affect individual-level consumption and thus
their broader economic situation. Baker argues that perceptions of improved
8 International Labor Organization (2010). It is important to note that mobile factors approaches
assume full employment, which in strict terms, limits the theory to anticipating only wage decreases.
9 See, for example, Kabeer (2000), Saavedra (2001) and Mathew (2006).
10 See, Artecona and Cunningham (2002).
11 Seligson (1999); Kaltenthaler, Gelleny, and Ceccoli (2004).
12 See Varley (1996).
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consumption opportunities as a result of more open trade help to drive more
positive attitudes toward liberalized trade.13 It is possible that women – generally
highly active in household-level purchasing – more strongly consider policies
that potentially affect consumption. A recent survey, reported by the Boston Consulting Group, of 12,000 women in 21 countries estimates that women are responsible for nearly two-thirds of purchasing worldwide.14 With an increasing number
of women heading households, perhaps especially so in developing countries,
this proportion of purchasing will likely continue to increase.15 Accordingly, it is
reasonable to anticipate that women’s perceptions of the effects of trade policy
on consumption – including the price, quality and variety of consumer goods
– may directly affect their policy attitudes. Note that following this logic, women
should be more supportive of open trade because of these positive effects on
consumption.
In a similar vein, Hall, Kao, and Nelson examine the historical relationship
between female political influence and trade policy utilizing a logic that suggests
that women have more of a consumption-based perception of trade policy and
are going to be more in favor of liberalized trade because tariffs increase prices.16
Comparing US tariff levels before and after women’s enfranchisement, they find
a gender gap wherein policy became more open – at least in terms of tariff levels
– after this systemic change in voter eligibility, though they note the large number
of possible conflicting or complementary explanations. In essence, the researchers are suggesting that women are more likely to condition their votes on changes
in prices, while men tend to emphasize wages. The research, however, does not
explicitly consider the interaction of gender and education.
Women’s central interest in consumption presents at least two related theoretical possibilities. First, because women across education and income groups
are generally active in household purchasing, the perceived consumptive benefits
from trade might cause all women to look more favorably on this aspect of open
trade (or even tilt general attitudes of women more positively toward open and/
or international trade). Or second, women with more limited means – indicated
best by lower levels of education and/or income – might be more sensitive to their
purchasing power because necessary items comprise such a large proportion of
their typical basket of goods.17 Thus, women with lower levels of education and/
13 Baker (2003, 2009).
14 Boston Consulting Group (2008).
15 Varley (1996) argues that women-led households are in fact dramatically undercounted because the convention has been to count only single-female-parent with dependents as “womanled.”
16 Hall, Kao, and Nelson (1998).
17 See, e.g., Booth et al. (1993).
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or income will be more supportive of open trade because of its positive effects on
consumption (and their purchasing power relative to their purchasing power preliberalization). Since both surveys query respondents directly about how they
think trade and/or trade policy is affecting their consumption, it is possible to
examine this relationship directly.

2.2 Sociotropic
Somewhat outside of the mobile factors framework, some scholars suggest
that perceptions of the macroeconomic or “sociotropic” environment, including overall economic growth and/or broader employment opportunities in the
general economy, have an effect on attitudes toward trade. For example, Mansfield and Mutz find that in the US, regardless of gender, respondents’ sociotropic
concerns have a resounding impact on their attitudes toward trade: people who
view the economy positively are more supportive of open trade.18 In developing
countries, where there is ample evidence that trade can disproportionately affect
vulnerable segments of the population under certain circumstances, it is reasonable to expect individuals to demonstrate concern about trade’s macroeconomic
effects. But the theoretical expectations are complex and not well developed.
For example, it is challenging to disentangle individuals’ perceptions of their
pocketbook concerns from sociotropic ones because it is not clear that people
can make these distinctions clearly. Is it reasonable to expect that an individual
would support free trade if it is working well for the broader economy but not
for them individually? Finally, there are no clear expectations for specific gender
implications.

2.3 Ideas and education
Scholars have also focused on exposure to ideas and information about the economic principles of trade, as well as on education more generally, in order to
explain trade attitudes. Hiscox and Hainmueller argue that the actual ideas that
people learn are important in terms of shaping their attitudes toward trade.19
They posit that the fairly consistent positive relationship between education and
support for free trade in developed countries that scholars have found is more
a function of educated people’s exposure to specific economic ideas. Burgoon
18 Mansfield and Mutz (2009).
19 Hainmueller and Hiscox (2006).
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and Hiscox’s version of this basic argument includes a gender twist by suggesting
that the gap between men and women is mainly a difference in their exposure
to economic ideas.20 The authors argue that men are more likely to be exposed
to ideas that support freer trade such as comparative advantage – e.g., by being
more likely to take a college economics class – and therefore will be more likely
to prefer policies that correspond to these ideas. They test their hypothesis using
data from the US and find that incorporating knowledge of trade issues (or suitable proxies) considerably closes the gender gap even after controlling for alternative explanations including those more focused on mobility and consumption.
The logic of the “ideas” hypothesis is extremely challenging to test because it
is necessary to know the actual ideas to which individuals have been exposed. One
crude possibility is that college-educated women have generally been exposed to
more economic ideas than women without a college education because of the
relative sophistication of the subject material compared to other educational
experiences (e.g., high school or vocational institutions), and they will therefore
be more positive toward trade. Some important shortcomings of this claim are
discussed in greater detail below.
The human capital explanation interprets the role of education differently
than the “ideas” approach. Scholars who privilege the importance of human
capital argue that no matter the context, people with more education are better
poised in the labor market and will be more supportive of general social welfaremaximizing policies such as liberalized trade.21 Thus, regardless of their status in
terms of factor abundance and/or the economic ideas to which they have been
exposed, more educated people – including women – should be more supportive
of liberalizing trade.
In the cases of both the ideas and human capital, a clear pattern should
emerge across the data and corresponding analyses below. If either or both are
helping to explain some of the variation – and we will not be able to discern
which with these data – we should observe consistently that better educated
women support open trade (in any country).

2.4 Risk preferences
A strand of the economics literature examining why men and women often make
different economic decisions privileges the role of risk. In particular, studies cite
the possible gender effects of emotions, overconfidence, and interpretations of
20 Burgoon and Hiscox (2004).
21 See, e.g., Gabel (1998).
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risk as threat or a challenge; some have argued that women tend to be more emotional and less “overconfident” than men and are more likely to interpret risk as
a threat.22 Because economic liberalization by nature entails some, if not significant, risk, this logic could be used as a theoretical starting point to understand
preferences toward changes in trade policy.
While we cannot test these propositions directly – in fact, most of this literature is based on controlled laboratory experiments – we can predict the general
results that we should observe if this logic is suitable in helping to explain trade
preferences. If women by “nature” are simply more emotional, less overconfident
and see risk as a threat, there should be systematic evidence of women, ceteris
paribus, being more likely to reject the riskiness of a potentially changed economic context – i.e., liberalized trade – no matter their status in terms of factor
endowments (and/or other variables). To further complicate this proposition,
however, Atkinson et al. have found that education and knowledge can attenuate gender differences in economic decisions.23 If this is the case, then we should
see clear evidence of educated and/or trade-knowledgeable women more likely to
support trade liberalization.

2.5 Specific factors
Finally, a specific factors approach suggests that the individual’s industry strongly
influences trade policy preferences: individuals in export-oriented sectors are
more likely to support open trade while those in import-competing sectors prefer
more closed trade policies.24 In a recent working paper, Beaulieu and Napier test a
specific factors hypothesis and a related tradables versus non-tradables hypothesis and find that neither sectoral differences in employment nor employment
in a tradable versus a non-tradable sector helps to explain gender differences
in attitudes toward trade.25 They do find, however, that the gender gap is more
pronounced in developed economies than in developing ones, but do not offer an
explanation as to why. They conclude in part that the lack of a clear explanation
of the gender gap in attitudes may be due to immeasurable differences between
the attributes of males and females. Unfortunately, we were unable to find appropriate survey data to test this hypothesis meaningfully.

22
23
24
25

See Crosson and Gneezy (2009) for a review.
Atkinson, Baird, and Frye (2003).
See Mayda and Rodrik (2005).
Beaulieu and Napier (2008).
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3 Data and methodology
3.1 Data
The data are drawn from two recent public opinion surveys. The first survey
was administered in the US while the second was conducted in five countries
with predominant or large Muslim populations (Azerbaijan, Egypt, Indonesia,
Nigeria, and Turkey).26 These surveys provide considerable variation in terms of
the average income, the type of political system and the structure of the national
economies, among other country-level variables.
The US survey is “Fortune Magazine Poll # 2008-4311: Economy,” which was
fielded in 2008 by Abt – Schulman, Ronca & Bucuvalas, Incorporated (SRBI).27
The survey sought to examine the attitudes of 1000 randomly-selected individuals toward the US economy and related issues in the first year of the worldwide
economic crisis.
The second survey was administered in countries with predominantly or
large Muslim populations in early 2008 by www.worldpublicopinion.org, which
is a collaborative project involving research centers from around the world and
managed by the Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA) at the University of Maryland.28 The original survey sought the opinions of a random sample
of more than 5000 individuals in eight countries about globalization and related
issues including international trade. Four of the five survey countries are among
the top 10 countries in the world with the largest Muslim populations (all but
Azerbaijan).
Note that we are not attempting to integrate the findings from the analyses of
the two surveys. We fully recognize that they are not readily comparable in such a
direct fashion because of the different contexts of survey implementation and the
different questions. However, we argue that there is inherent value in looking at
the broader pattern of findings to determine if the effects are broadly consistent
with theoretical constructs.

26 The broader Muslim-country survey also included Great Britain, Iran, and Palestine, but
questions about trade were excluded entirely for Great Britain and Iran, and basic demographic
variables were excluded for Palestine. Where possible, we run alternative analyses in order to
include Palestine, and consistently; these results are similar to those presented in this research.
27 Fortune Magazine (2008).
28 World Public Opinion (2008).
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3.2 Dependent variables
As the survey data permit, we seek to use dependent variables that examine both
trade policy attitudes generally and individuals’ attitudes toward trade’s major
effects, including on jobs, mobility, economic pocketbook issues, macroeconomic performance and consumption. While the precise questions vary, there is
sufficient continuity across the two surveys to generate a meaningful discussion
comparing the results (see Data Appendix A for the wording of each question).
In the US survey, the dependent variables are direct queries about attitudes
on trade generally, and its effects on the respondent personally, workers, business and consumption. Though three responses are possible, for reasons of data
analysis and more intuitive presentation of results, we have re-coded the variable
dichotomously wherein a “1” indicates support for free trade.
The questions in the survey of Muslim countries tap into several of the same
conceptual issues as the other survey, and include trade generally and trade’s
effects on consumption, job security, job creation, standard of living and domestic business. There is one additional question about trade’s effects on the environment that is difficult to place directly in this research’s broader theoretical
discussion but which we include as a robustness and stability check for the significance and direction of the coefficients of the variables included in the other
analyses. The possible answers to all of these questions are dichotomous: “good”
(1) or “bad” (0).

3.3 Independent variables
Considering the theoretical inquiry of this research, the first independent variable is gender. Following most research, it is a dummy variable where “female”
is set to 1. Drawing from the general literature on trade attitudes, other key variables include: education; age; income; prospective economic outlook; and ideology and/or political party. Where data permit and there is compelling theoretical
logic and/or strong precedent in the literature, we include several other controls
in some analyses.
The second major independent variable most relevant to this theoretical
inquiry, education, is a very complex variable in the trade attitudes literature
and, as discussed above, is often poorly developed theoretically. Scholars use it
to represent mobility by identifying if an individual is part of the abundant factor,
the level of individual human capital, and “knowledge” about trade and related
economic issues.
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In this research, it is particularly important theoretically to understand how
gender and education interact, and if there are distinct patterns across different
types of countries. Accordingly, in order to generate a meaningful interaction, we
first dichotomize education into college graduate and those who are not college
graduates. Hainmueller and Hiscox present empirical data supporting the contention that college education – more than any other type of education – has
a measurable and significant effect on support for free trade.29 We then create
an interaction between the two dummy variables: college graduate and female.
In addition, in contrast to using the ordered education variable in the interaction term, generating an interaction of gender and the dichotomous education
variable permits more meaningful interpretations of the constituent terms. The
female constituent term represents women who are not college graduates, while
the college graduate constituent term represents males with college degrees.
Age is often linked by scholars to aspects of broader adaptability in the workforce. In particular, scholars suggest that older people are more typically less able
or perhaps less willing to relocate, so policies such as liberalizing trade that can
have implications for dislocating workers are often less popular with them. In
each dataset, age is a continuous measure by year.
Like education, income is also often poorly developed theoretically. High
incomes can indicate some level of adaptability or flexibility, or perhaps even propensity for risk. High incomes can also indicate more consumptive power. Income
is also usually highly correlated (and/or causally related) to education, so it is not
easy to disentangle these complexities. In any event, it is positively related to attitudes toward open trade and statistically significant in most research. In terms
of measurement across the surveys, though the actual increments are different,
the measures are conceptually similar. The US survey uses a seven-point scale:
1 represents respondents reporting income < $20,000; 2 = $20,000 to just under
$35,000; 3 = $35,000 to just under $50,000; 4 = $50,000 to just under $75,000;
5 = $75,000 to just under $100,000; 6 = $100,000 to just under $150,000; and
7 = $150,000 or more. In the Muslim-country survey, using specific scales for each
country relative to cost of living, the surveyors use a three-point income scale of
low, medium and high, which we code from 1 to 3, respectively.
Studies have found a consistent positive relationship between broader macroeconomic outlook and attitudes toward open trade.30 Though theoretically it is
challenging to disentangle this notion from mobility and/or economic security
distinctly (and from several of the dependent variables, too), it appears likely

29 Hainmueller and Hiscox (2006).
30 See particularly Mansfield and Mutz (2009).
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that many citizens consider the broader economy and link those perceptions to
the policies that may be affecting it, including trade policy. In the US survey, the
question is a short-term prospective, one in which the survey asks if the economy
is “getting better” (coded 1), staying the same (0), or getting worse (–1).” Unfortunately, there are no sociotropic questions asked in the Muslim-country data, nor
any questions that could serve as a reasonable proxy.
Though it has been much less consistently demonstrated in the empirical research, Kaltenthaler et al. posit that attitudes toward trade policy are
shaped by more of a personal economic interest or “pocketbook” concerns.31
Again, only the US survey asks a pocketbook economic question: Just thinking about your own personal economic situation, do you feel that over the past
12 months things have gotten better (coded as 1), worse (–1), or stayed about
the same (0)?
Some researchers have posited a strong link between ideology and attitudes toward trade. But once again, the theoretical logic is far from clear. On
the one hand, from the viewpoint of a mobile factors approach, political parties
that are supported largely by the abundant labor factor should have supporters that are in favor of more open trade. In developed countries, these parties
should be right-leaning and supported by capital and higher-skilled citizens,
and in developing countries, these parties should be left-leaning and supported
by lower-skilled labor.32 The US survey offers data on political party affiliation
and ideology, and we code the political party variable on a five-point scale with
strong Democrat coded to 1, a leans-Democrat coded as 2, an independent that
reports no leaning to either party as 3, a leans-Republican as 4 and a strong
Republican coded as 5.33
In order to examine preliminarily the trade knowledge hypothesis using the
US survey data, we include a measure of self-identified trade knowledge.34 Of
course, whether the respondent is qualified to assess his or her own knowledge of
trade is a separate but important issue; in effect, in many cases, it is more likely a
measure of individual-level issue salience than actual knowledge. In either event,

31 Kaltenthaler, Gelleny, and Ceccoli (2004).
32 While this dynamic seems to hold well in analyses of trade openness in developed countries,
scholars have found more support for openness in some developing countries from right-leaning
parties (e.g., Magaloni and Romero 2008) or a near convergence in support for more open p
 olicies
between the left and right (e.g., Armijo and Faucher 2002; Kingstone and Young 2009).
33 A separate question in the survey asks respondents if they self-identify as liberals or conservatives. We use this measure as an alternative, and it produces substantively similar results to
the political party variable.
34 See Burgoon and Hiscox (2004).
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we argue that it is a useful control. The question asks: On another topic, compared
to most other issues in the news, how closely do you follow news about US trade
with foreign countries – very closely (3), somewhat closely (2), not very closely (1),
or not at all (0)?
Lastly, scholars have posited that religion might affect outlook on economic
liberalization. Briefly, researchers posit that some religious-based social movements are skeptical of modernization and/or strong policies that they conceptualize as secular.35 Only the Muslim-country survey asks a religion question and it is
limited to Muslim (coded “1”) and non-Muslim (“0”).

3.4 Methodology
The dichotomous nature of the responses suggests the use of logistic regression.36
As a general check on the robustness of the results, we also re-run the models
using probit analysis. The results do not change substantively from the logistic
regression results. The results for the US are given in Table 1.
Because country-level traits might affect the results, we include country
dummies in the analysis of the multi-country survey results. It is possible that
specific characteristics of certain countries affect the results, but without more
countries to establish a sample at this higher level of analysis, it is not possible to control meaningfully for these possibilities. In an ideal scenario, a hierarchical model a la Baker would be utilized, but under the constraints of the
data – specifically, too few countries – the best alternative is the use of a set of
country dummies.37 The important issue when choosing the baseline country is
a sufficient sample size: you do not want the baseline sample to be small. Since
the country samples are similar in size it does not matter in this regard which
country we choose. Some scholars propose using the most “average” case though
the selection conceptually is mostly arbitrary. We present results in Table 2 using
Nigeria as the baseline, but it has no substantive effect on the results which
country we use.

35 See Daniels and von der Ruhr (2005).
36 We run the models for the US using the original three-point scale in both ordered logistic and
probit regressions and these models produce substantively similar results to the regular logit and
probit models in terms of direction, size and strength of the coefficients.
37 Baker (2005, 2009).
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Table 1 Logistic regression of individual attitudes toward International trade and its effects in
the US, 2008.

Female
College graduate
Female*College graduate
Income
Age
Party
Pocketbook economic
Prospective sociotropic outlook
Trade knowledge
Constant
Observations+

General

Consumer

Workers

Business

Personal

–0.40*
(0.19)
0.27
(0.22)
0.19
(0.32)
0.13*
(0.05)
–0.08*
(0.04)
0.009
(0.17)
0.18
(0.13)
0.76**
(0.15)
0.002
(0.10)
–0.46
(0.35)
852

–0.58**
(0.19)
0.26
(0.21)
0.57*
(0.29)
0.18**
(0.05)
–0.13**
(0.04)
0.09
(0.16)
0.33**
(0.12)
0.36**
(0.14)
–0.09
(0.09)
0.51
(0.33)
865

–0.83**
(0.29)
–0.09
(0.27)
0.90**
(0.41)
–0.007
(0.06)
–0.14**
(0.04)
0.09
(0.21)
0.37**
(0.16)
0.62**
(0.17)
–0.03
(0.12)
–0.34
(0.41)
872

–0.58**
(0.20)
0.12
(0.21)
0.37
(0.29)
0.07
(0.05)
–0.02
(0.04)
0.22
(0.16)
0.30**
(0.11)
0.39**
(0.14)
0.11
(0.09)
–0.25
(0.32)
864

–0.54**
(0.21)
0.43*
(0.22)
0.19
(0.31)
0.09*
(0.05)
–0.12**
(0.04)
–0.09
(0.16)
0.39**
(0.12)
0.40**
(0.15)
–0.07
(0.09)
0.18
(0.34)
836

Standard errors in parentheses. **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05.
The number of observations varies because not all respondents answered every trade
question.
+

4 Results and discussion
The findings from the empirical analyses of the two surveys reveal preliminary
evidence that a mobile factors-inspired theoretical argument to explain gender
differences in the perceptions of trade policy is, at a minimum, a reasonable
starting point for explaining the results in the US survey, though much less
so for the survey in the five developing countries. Partly consistent with the
predictions of this research’s theoretical framework, the results demonstrate
that there are sometimes important differences in how gender affects attitudes
toward trade among those respondents from the developed country and the
developing countries in these analyses. In brief, in the US, we find that college-educated women tend to perceive the effects of international trade more
positively than women without college degrees, though college educated-
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Table 2 Logistic regression of individual attitudes toward International trade and its effects in
five predominantly muslim countries, 2007.
Consumption
Trade
Female

0.11
(0.09)
College graduate 0.59**
(0.16)
Female*College
–0.42+
(0.24)
graduate
Age
0.004
(0.003)
Income
0.12*
(0.06)
Muslim
–0.59**
(0.11)
Constant
0.46**
(0.17)
N of Obs
3341

Consumer

Economic security

Other

Job
Job Standard Domestic Environsecurity creation of living business
ment

0.09
0.02
0.06
(0.09)
(0.09)
(0.09)
0.14
0.22
0.34*
(0.16)
(0.15)
(0.15)
–0.12
0.09
–0.04
(0.24)
(0.23)
(0.23)
0.01
0.01*
0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
0.13*
0.03
0.06
(0.06)
(0.06)
(0.06)
–0.18 –0.81** –0.62**
(0.12)
(0.11)
(0.11)
0.93**
0.02
0.20
(0.18)
(0.17)
(0.17)
3186
3107
3266

0.07
(0.09)
0.26
(0.16)
0.13
(0.24)
0.003
(0.003)
0.13*
(0.06)
–0.52**
(0.11)
0.49**
(0.17)
3099

0.31**
0.11
(0.09)
(0.08)
0.57**
0.25
(0.16)
(0.14)
–0.45+
0.03
(0.24)
(0.22)
0.04
0.01**
(0.003) (0.003)
–0.01 –0.005
(0.06)
(0.05)
–0.86** –0.61**
(0.11)
(0.10)
0.37*
–0.07
(0.17)
(0.16)
3269
3152

Standard errors in parentheses. **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05, +p < 0.10.

women do appear to support it on average not much differently than their
male counterparts with or without a college degree. In contrast, in developing
countries, the results of the multivariate analyses – though much less statistically significant than the US analyses – suggest preliminarily a rather different scenario. College-educated men were the most likely to support economic
openness. Women were a little less likely to support free trade, with very little
discernible gap between college-educated and non-college educated. The most
pronounced gap was with men without a college degree, who were notably
less likely than the other three groups to support economic openness. With the
caveat that the statistical significances were very weak or often non-existent,
this finding does not augur well for a gender/mobile factors approach for these
developing countries.
With binary logit models with interactive terms, a more meaningful interpretation of the results requires some additional empirical effort. Accordingly,
following Mitchell and Chen, we graph the results so we can better understand
the substance of the results – in this case, to visualize the different propensities
to support open trade of the discrete groups of interest generated by interacting
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Figure 1 “International trade… is good for consumers in the US” – Visualization of main effects
and interactions of gender and college education.

the gender and college-educated variables.38 The vital benefit of such a technique
is that it incorporates the contributions of the covariates when we use predicted
probabilities to interpret the broader effects. We also argue that it is a particularly
intuitive way to examine the data. For both the sake of simplicity of presentation
and, more importantly, because the patterns are remarkably consistent across
the different dependent variables within the results for each survey, we present
only one graph (i.e., one “sample” dependent variable) for the results from each
survey/table.
In Figure 1, we observe that the predicted probability of college-educated
men and women to believe that international trade benefits consumers is about
equal at slightly < 0.6. Their male peers without college degrees are only marginally less likely to share this belief. Women without a college degree, however,
are much less likely to think that trade is good for consumers (almost 0.3). This
result bears out consistently in a statistically significant manner across the different components of free trade that we test, suggesting a robust finding. The one
small difference that we note is a shift downward of all of the probabilities with
the question about “workers” – the probabilities across all four groups are much
lower ( < 0.3) though very much in the same overall pattern visible in Figure 1.
Arguably, if we consider a more “pure” mobile factors approach, the positive
finding for less-educated males is puzzling. If anything, the anecdotal evidence
– the peer-reviewed literature is so far relatively sparse – suggests that steady
decreases in manufacturing in the US have particularly hurt male workers who

38 Mitchell and Chen (2005).
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Figure 2 “International trade is good for companies…” – Visualization of main effects and
interactions of gender and college education in five developing countries.

are not college-educated.39 Perhaps a plausible explanation for this discrepancy
lies in the risk-focused literature discussed above, which suggests that men have
a larger appetite for risk, including new economic policies. However, the preliminary results below from the five developing countries cast some doubt on the
contention that men are generally more risk-tolerant. We do not have a good
explanation for this finding and it suggests a path for future research.
On a related note, a mobile factors approach assumes full employment. While
it is reasonable to argue that women are concerned about wage levels, it is likely
that they also have grave direct concerns about their employment status – i.e.,
job or no job – and concerns well beyond the individual level. The results from
these analyses clearly bear out women’s broad concerns about trade liberalization. These more comprehensive interpretations, however, are not well accounted
for theoretically in a strict mobile factors approach, so it seems reasonable to consider relaxing this assumption to allow for these concerns.
Finally, the graphical representation in Figure 1 strongly suggests that the
consistent negative general finding for gender across many studies may be driven
in considerable part by women with less education in developed countries. The
negative and significant coefficient that scholars have observed in many of the
studies may be missing the fact that it really depends on the key characteristic of
women. Thus, the “median” woman might have a more negative outlook toward
free trade but it hardly tells the whole story.
The graphical representation in Figure 2 tells a different story for these five
developing countries. In this figure, we see that college educated men are the
39 For example, “Decline of the working man: why ever fewer low-skilled American men have
jobs,” Economist, 28 April 2011.
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most likely to be positive toward international trade, while college-educated
women are the next most likely group to support it, followed closely by women
without college degrees, and lastly men without college degrees. Note, however,
that the spread amongst these groups is much tighter than we observe in Figure 1
for the US. Also, note that both lines are well above the 0.5 mark, suggesting that
all individuals in all four groups are more likely to be positive toward international trade than not. These patterns repeat across the other five analyses that
examine effects of international trade on consumption, job creation, job security,
standard of living and environment. This finding is in marked contrast to the US
where overall support across the components of free trade is simply lower, which
begs for more analytical attention in future surveys and corresponding research.
Considering that neither gender nor the interaction between gender and education is significant in most of these analyses, we have to consider these results
very cautiously. This finding of little or no effect might suggests that there is a
less strong gendered component to trade attitudes in these five developing countries with large or predominant Muslim populations. More research is necessary
to explain meaningfully why there are more limited effects of gender, especially
compared to the US, and also to determine if this is a pattern across other developing countries and regions.

4.1 Consumption
The finding from the US survey that educated women are more likely than their
non-college educated female counterparts to state that they believe that free trade
is positive for consumers is puzzling in light of the existing research. This finding
is not consistent with Hall et al.’s theoretical supposition about perceptions of
how women link tariffs and price.40 The evidence in this US survey suggests that
is rather uncertain that all women share this viewpoint.

4.2 Education and/or knowledge
The divergent results between the US and developing countries in these surveys
suggest that scholars need to pay closer attention to issues of education and
knowledge. While this research finds generally what Burgoon and Hiscox41 and

40 Hall, Kao, and Nelson (1998).
41 Burgoon and Hiscox (2004).
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Hainmueller and Hiscox42 find – that educated people in the US, and perhaps
especially educated women, have more positive viewpoints toward open trade –
the finding that men without college education do not differ markedly cast some
doubt on both the human capital and knowledge arguments. In developing countries, there simply is not much statistically significant variation among these
groups. If the human capital hypothesis were valid, we would not likely observe
that, e.g., women without college degrees hold similar views toward international trade as their educated counterparts.
This research does examine very preliminarily the closely-related issue of trade
knowledge using the US survey. The coefficients of the trade knowledge variable
are mixed in direction and are never statistically significant across the five analyses.43 When we generate an interaction of trade knowledge and gender, it does not
produce results that are statistically significant. Women who follow trade closely do
not have views statistically different from women who do not follow the topic closely.
It is possible that many respondents, regardless of gender, do not really understand
the complexities of international trade, and the survey question that this research
utilizes is an unreliable measure. However, it is also possible that an individual’s
actual knowledge of trade does not affect their views of it in any discernible pattern;
in other words, the distribution of those who are negative or positive toward trade
openness is comparable no matter the level of knowledge, which is similar to the
issues discussed directly above. Future surveys need to develop better questions
that actually test people’s economic and trade knowledge more objectively.

4.3 Risk
As acknowledged above, we cannot effectively test risk-based hypotheses directly
with these data, but the general trends suggest that risk might be a situationspecific explanation. If women are more risk-averse naturally, then we should
observe systematic negative trends in women’s attitudes toward trade across the
two surveys. These results do not bear out such a consistency. Similarly, as discussed above, there is possibly a divergence among men, too, with preliminary
evidence that men without a college degree in these developing countries are the
least supportive of international trade. Considering the complexity of the relationship between risk and trade attitudes, a next logical step in terms of testing these
potential explanations might include more work in the experimental laboratory.
42 Hainmueller and Hiscox (2006).
43 Removing the knowledge variable from the analysis does not change any other result substantively.
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5 Alternative explanations
While the results for many of the control variables vary among the analyses
depending on the survey and the particular dependent variable, there are some
consistent findings of theoretical note. One of the most stable findings using the
US survey is the direction and significance of the coefficients for prospective economic outlook variable: in nearly every analysis, the coefficients of this variable
are positive and statistically significant. This finding is consistent with Mansfield
and Mutz’s finding across two national surveys in the US.44 If a respondent is optimistic about the nation’s economic prospects, they are much likelier to support
international trade generally, or to think that it has positive effects on specific
facets of the economy (e.g., consumption, mobility, macroeconomic, etc.).
There are, however, potential problematic issues with sociotropic variables
that scholars sometimes do not acknowledge sufficiently. Undoubtedly, there is
genuine potential for tautology because the crude logic suggests that (dis)satisfaction with the economy leads to (dis)satisfaction with a major component of
the economy – i.e., trade. On a closely related note, it is difficult to know whether
sociotropic issues belong on the left- or the right-hand side of the empirical equations. There is a reasonable case for both and scholars should consider these
issues more carefully.
In the Muslim-country survey, the coefficients of the Muslim dummy variable
are negative and statistically significant in six of the seven analyses (not the consumer dependent variable), suggesting that Muslim respondents are much less
likely to support trade generally or to think that it has positive impacts on any
major aspect such as jobs or the macro-economy. There could be myriad explanations for this finding and it deserves considerably more investigation in future
research, particularly considering the general conclusion of the surveyors that
Muslims are generally supportive of globalization, which was based on aggregated responses not on multivariate analysis with appropriate controls.45
Age demonstrates an unanticipated divergence between the two surveys
in terms of the direction and consistency of the statistical significances of the
coefficients. As with many other empirical studies, the findings for age in the US
survey suggest a negative relationship: older people are less likely to be supportive of free trade or to believe that it has widespread positive effects. In all analyses
for the US, the coefficients for age are negative, and in four of the five analyses,
they are statistically significant. In the Muslim-country survey, age is positive
in all analyses, though only significant with the job security and environment
44 Mansfield and Mutz (2009).
45 See, World Public Opinion (2008).
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dependent variables, and the magnitude of effect is small. It is possible that in
many developing countries, older people recall the long-term economic challenges associated with closed economies, though new survey data would be necessary to address this issue effectively.
As discussed above, across the analyses, income is fairly consistently positive and significant at the 5% level in nearly half the analyses. Respondents with
higher incomes are more likely to deem international trade as good generally, or
positive for specific aspects of their lives or for their country. Again, income is
easily conflated with other variables in the analysis, especially education, and
scholars must continue to consider these complexities.
Political party is not a strong predictor of attitudes toward trade policies in
the US. The coefficients of the political party variables are never statistically significant and are inconsistent in terms of direction. This finding might have to do
with the broad umbrella of diverse groups that each of the two major parties has
become, wherein support for trade varies greatly among these groups.

6 Conclusions
By using an original analytical approach that focuses not just on general attitudes toward free or international trade, but for the first time on a significant
scale, on attitudes toward the issues and components of free/international trade
and its effects, this research generates some valuable theoretical insight into and
empirical illustrations of how gender may be affecting preferences toward trade
policies. The evidence suggests that a mobile factors/economic security approach
helps us to understand better how gender is affecting trade policy attitudes in
the US. Women who perceive that they are more economically secure or perhaps
observe better economic prospects – at least in the face of trade policy change –
tend to be more sanguine about trade liberalization. In contrast, women who find
themselves in more vulnerable economic positions are more skeptical about policies of freer trade. Considering that the preponderance of research on trade attitudes includes only developed countries and finds a consistently negative gender
effect, this very robust finding for the US is enormously important. Moreover,
these findings are robust to trade’s broader economic effects – similar patterns
clearly emerge across multiple facets of trade. While scholars must do more work
to test these relationships, empirical evidence supporting broader mobile factors
of trade attitudes explanations may be partly driven by gender.
The “non-” findings for the gender-education interaction in the developing
country survey clearly suggests that the broader explanation is complex. These
findings do not support well the gender/mobile factors framework. If this were
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the case, we would observe much weaker support from college-educated women
in these countries. The findings also cast some doubt on the human capital
argument: less education does not necessarily automatically translate into less
support for economic liberalization. Scholars need to dissect the specific components of the overall explanations and corresponding theoretical frameworks
better. In particular, in most research, the mobility, human capital, knowledge
and ideas components are not sufficiently distinct. In terms of a mobile factors
approach, it is quite likely that our old definitions of “scarce” and “abundant”
factors are much less meaningful in this highly globalized world, particularly in
rapidly-growing middle-income countries such as Turkey. To examine better the
knowledge and ideas arguments, scholars need to probe the individual’s technical background and preconceptions about principles of trade more objectively,
not only by testing their economic and trade knowledge, but also by determining
better what is being taught in universities or other educational venues concerning
trade, and how the media are presenting these issues in each country.
The theoretical implications of these findings demand further testing of the economic security-focused propositions in new and different contexts. This research
generates compelling results from analyses using public opinion data from the US,
but it is clear that future research needs to test this proposition in other developed
economies. Similarly, the findings from the survey of five important predominantlyMuslim countries in Asia and Africa demand that we investigate whether a lack of a
gender gap exists in other contexts. If these two patterns emerge consistently across
space (and perhaps time), it is very clear that the research community needs to be
more innovative in our theoretical thinking. Hopefully, too, more pollsters will ask
about attitudes toward trade’s effects on multiple relevant aspects and not the blunt,
much less useful, instrument that has been ubiquitous in previous surveys. Similarly, surveys executed with similar methodologies across multiple, varied countries
over time would greatly enhance our abilities to infer from these type of data.
With trade policy continuing to be high on both national and international
agendas, it behooves researchers and policymakers to learn more about how attitudes and preferences develop. A recent major event in Latin America demonstrates the importance of developing a better understanding of individual-level
trade attitudes. The 2007 referendum in Costa Rica on the ratification of a free
trade agreement among the Central American countries, the US and the Dominican Republic only narrowly passed and public opinion polls suggest that men
were slightly more likely to support the pact than women.46 With such a close
46 Surveys from both the Universidad de Costa Rica’s (UCR) Escuela de Estadistica and Centro
de Estudios de Opinion immediately after the referendum and Latin American Public Opinion
Project in early 2008 suggest this result.
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vote, for either the “yes” or the “no” side, the disproportionate preferences of specific major discrete groups, such as those defined by gender and/or education,
may well have played a role in the final outcome. Across time and space, there
continues to be some evidence of a gender component to differences in these
individual-level trade policy preferences and this research takes important steps
toward parsing out some of the explanations of this phenomenon.
Acknowledgments: We thank Andy Baker, Lowell Barrington, Doug Hecock, John
McAdams, Kathy Rehbein and McGee Young for comments on earlier versions
of this research; Ben Bishin for his work on a related project; and attendees at
the Department of Economics Research Colloquium at Marquette University who
gave excellent feedback. Of course, all errors remain our own.

Appendix A – Survey questions
US Survey
The general question reads:
1. As you may know, international trade has increased a great deal in recent
years. Do you think that the growth in international trade has made things
better or made things worse for the US as a whole?
The trade effects questions use the same root as the general question, but replace
the underlined with the following:
2. … for you personally?
3. … for American workers?
4. … for American business?
5. … for consumers in the US?
Muslim-Country Survey
1. Do you think international trade is good or bad for creating jobs in [country]?
2. Do you think international trade is good or bad for job security for [country]
workers?
3. Do you think international trade is good or bad for [country] economy?
4. Do you think international trade is good or bad for[country] companies?
5. Do you think international trade is good or bad for your own standard of
living?
6. Do you think international trade is good or bad for consumers like you?
7. Do you think international trade is good or bad for the environment?
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